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Introduction
Captain Wayne Hughes, USN, who would have turned 90-years-old this spring, left us a huge legacy on
which to build and from which to learn regarding the intellectual content of naval research, our
approaches to instruction, and how we organize our naval PME institutions. Hughes is widely recognized
and respected for his work on naval tactics and operations research (OR) and his “fire effectively first”
aphorism, which continues to inform the thinking behind many strategic documents.
If we take a more expansive look at Hughes’ contributions, however, we also find writings on naval
maneuver warfare,  the influence of organizations on naval tactics,  the limitations of analytical models
and their ability to reduce risk but not eliminate uncertainty,  education and mentorship,  his favorite
admirals,  maritime innovation and shipbuilding adaptation,  the need for innovative leaders and the role
of PME in educating them, and the importance of people, among other topics. Concerning the range of his
own intellectual interests, he noted, “I like everything, but that means I can’t be very deep at anything.”
Though he did obviously go deep into key topics, he maintained his broad interest, which also manifested
itself in the variety of books he reviewed and his touching upon some unexpected topics, such as rituals
and religion, in the context of naval warfare. His intellectual, theoretical, disciplinary, and
methodological range exemplified that of an integrative mind.
In addition to his research and writing, he advised countless students at the Naval Postgraduate School
and often eagerly visited classrooms, even in his last years, to discuss some of his favorite topics, as well as
what interested the students. He favored active learning approaches (e.g., cases, discussions, gaming, and
simulations as opposed to lecturing) since they facilitated more interaction, mutual learning, and a








Hughes’ approach to active learning is quite consistent with General David H. Berger’s plea in his
Commandant’s Planning Guidance to move beyond our industrial age model for training and education. C.
S. Lewis once said, “The task of the modern educator is not to cut down jungles but to irrigate
deserts.”  In other words, cultivating lifelong learning requires patience, mutual learning, and open
minds – a topic that remains central to military professionals today.
We wanted to write a brief note in Hughes’ honor and memory that complements and expands upon his
“fire effectively first” lens by incorporating the importance of the “think effectively first” truism it
implies.  We use some of Hughes’ reflections to identify the traits, attitudes, and values he admired in
others and thought we should strive to inculcate in our naval leaders. Just as integration is key to
instruction and active learning approaches, intellectual integration and synthesis helps develop the good
thinking and judgment that enables our warfighters to develop the intellectual adaptiveness central to
“thinking effectively first.”
The Skills and Traits of Hughes’ Favorite Admirals
During the spring of 2017, Thomas Ricks posted a series of four articles to his Best Defense blog that
Hughes—“an old salt”—had written about his four favorite admirals: Spruance, Burke, Fiske, and Nimitz.
They illustrate both Hughes’ implicit (and sometimes explicit) recognition of the attitudes and skills
central to “thinking effectively first,” and his own integrative way of thinking.
As a youthful teacher of naval history, Hughes first gained an early appreciation for Raymond Spruance
while reading about his meeting with Admiral Nimitz before the Battle of Midway. Hughes identified
Spruance’s background in electrical engineering and his operational and command tours as a few of the
foundations for Spruance’s greatness since they provided him a broad range of experiences and insights
upon which to draw and enhanced his ability to integrate and synthesize information.  This helped him
identify what was truly relevant and deepened his understanding of situations. In an earlier article on
Spruance, Hughes noted, “As operational commander of hundreds of ships and aircraft, Admiral
Raymond A. Spruance had the capacity to distill what he observed – and sometimes felt – into its essence
and to focus on the important details by mental synthesis.” According to Hughes, “Spruance had to an
extraordinary degree the mental equivalent of peripheral vision.”  Importantly, Spruance objected to
efforts intended to reduce decision-making to a recipe or checklist. As Spruance might have attested,
developing the “cognitive flexibility” to transfer knowledge between domains and apply knowledge to new
situations necessitates education focused more on broad concepts than on specific information or
processes. Additionally, given the complexity of and unpredictability in today’s operating environment, it
is increasingly important to nurture well-rounded naval leaders like Spruance who are able to identify
connections across disciplines so they can effectively determine the deep structure of a given problem,
understand the larger forces shaping situations, and thus anticipate possible outcomes and actions.
Like Spruance, Admiral Arleigh Burke also had an impressive technical background that led to his serving
more tours as an engineer than he might have liked. Burke was an excellent strategic leader who created
an effective organization by understanding how organizations work and how to get things done in (and
with) them. According to Hughes, “He was the last CNO to actually command the Navy’s operations.”  In
other words, Burke did not become mired in administrivia as an escape or diversion as the Navy
confronted a strategic inflection point. Instead, he identified new opportunities and ways of operating and
deployed resources to see them through.  This is particularly relevant for the U.S. military, which has
been described as “too busy to think” and operating in “a vacuum, one of strategy-free actions,” as it











Hughes dubbed Bradley A. Fiske a true “Renaissance Man.” A reformer, prolific author, and inventor, and
an innovative strategist and tactician, Fiske helped lead the Navy through the transition from sail to steam.
Early in his career, Fiske identified the need for electricity in the ships of the new Navy, so he requested a
leave of absence to study its potential for warships. At the time there were not any postgraduate schools
for science and technology, so he ended up at the GE plant in Schenectady, New York.  Later, he became
an aviation enthusiast and advocated using it in an anti-amphibious role in support of early versions of
War Plan Orange.  In his many roles, Fiske maintained a practical appreciation for technology as
opposed to a narrow focus on analytical models or technical expertise, and based on his deep
understanding of what was driving the strategic environment, he had an uncanny ability to identify
emerging technologies and embrace them. In class, Hughes occasionally brought up Kodak as a
counterexample. While Kodak had early technical expertise in digital technology, they failed to see how it
would influence the strategic environment and, ultimately, erode their competitive advantages.
Lastly, like the others, Chester Nimitz also had a deep understanding of technology and its relation to
tactics, a theme consistent with all of Hughes’ “greats.” Nimitz became an expert in diesel propulsion,
remained current with both submarines and surface ships, and even wrote a Naval War College term
paper on underway replenishment. He was not only an admired strategist, but also a superb tactician,
which was on display at the Battle of Midway, and a brilliant leader. Hughes credits his morale-building
after taking over as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet following the Pearl Harbor attacks with our later
success in the Pacific.  And yet we might draw an important lesson from his time commanding a
destroyer as an ensign when he ran the ship aground. The mistake did not end his career as it might today.
As Hughes used to say, the only way to never make a mistake is to never make a decision, thus recognizing
the danger of the no-default mentality on individual and organizational adaptability and thinking
Having briefly discussed Hughes’ reasons for choosing his favorite admirals, we note his appreciation of
their knowledge of technology. However, this was not the only factor (and probably not even the most
important one) when one looks at their accomplishments more broadly. Hughes valued judgment and
thinking, the development of insight, broad understanding and the ability to synthesize, and
organizational leadership skills. These are themes that resonate well with modern strategic documents,






July 3, 2018 – NPS Dean Emeritus Wayne Hughes holds the latest edition of his seminal work,
Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Nathan Serpico)
It also worth remembering that these qualities were valued much earlier in the history of naval education
and during periods of vast technological change similar to our own. For example, The Record of the
United States Naval Institute (later, Proceedings) established an annual prize essay competition in 1879,
and the first topic concerned naval education. In the third-prize essay, then Commander A. T. Mahan
cautioned, over a decade before the publication of his famous treatise, The Influence of Sea Power Upon
History: 1660-1783, against focusing too narrowly on mechanical processes and mathematical reasoning
“under the delusive cry of science.” Despite the increasing technical complexity associated with the ships
of the new Navy and the onset of steam, Mahan observed, “The necessarily materialistic character of
mechanical science tends rather to narrowness and low ideals.” He believed that a narrow scientific focus
ultimately undermined the practical discharge of the line officer’s duties, and while Mahan acknowledged
a small class of specialists should be devoted to this type of knowledge, he also argued the line officer
required a broader educational approach in order to discharge all of his many and varied duties.
Following World War I, the Knox-Pye-King Board conducted the first (and until E4S, only) comprehensive
analysis of U.S. naval education. At the time, a salt-horse culture prevailed in the Navy, and seagoing
experience established naval officers’ reputations for higher commands. The curriculum at the U.S. Naval
Academy trained future naval officers to adopt mathematical approaches to solving even the most abstract
problems, memorize accepted solutions, and adhere to hierarchical authority at the expense of open
inquiry and debate. However, as Admirals Henry T. Mayo and William S. Sims provided bureaucratic top
cover, Captains Dudley W. Knox and Ernest J. King, with Commander William S. Pye contributing,
leveraged the board’s report to proffer their assessment that naval officers stood ill-equipped to meet the
broad spectrum of challenges they faced and to establish higher professional education standards.  While
the officers acknowledged the need for a certain degree of specialization, it had to be balanced with a more
generalist mindset. The board observed that, at present, the naval officer was “‘educated’ only in
preparation for the lowest commissioned grade” and lacked sufficient understanding of higher operational
elements of warfare or broader strategic considerations. The board outlined an education continuum for
an officers’ career, which progressively evolved away from more technical matters and toward strategy,





Given the increasing complexity and prevalence of technologies and their rapid rate of advancement, calls
for increasing the number of specialists in the DoD and national security establishment are certainly
understandable. However, as we observe in Hughes’ reflections and in the thoughts of some of our other
great naval officers, we must not view this as a sufficient condition. We must also cultivate the other skills
and attitudes Hughes valued to develop leaders who are intellectually adaptive and capable of identifying
strategic trends, understanding and solving complex problems in an interdisciplinary manner, and
thinking effectively first.
How to Cultivate the “Think Effectively First” Mentality
“I think art comes before science, and science is merely a representation of the dynamic structure and
institutionalization of what the practical wisdom of people over the course of history develops.”
While Hughes’ reflections are useful in helping us see the importance of “thinking effectively first,” it is
also important to understand how Hughes was thinking (not just what he was thinking) and his way of
integrating. In doing so, we might identify a few more useful implications that can help us better think
about how we think, educate, learn, and analyze. 
Integrate education, research, and Navy problems—always with an eye for issues relevant to the
warfighter. As with other great integrative minds, Hughes was a strong advocate for integrating research
and education, always with a focus on what was relevant to Navy problems and warfighter issues. This
problem-oriented focus helps integrate the different disciplines that are relevant to understanding such
complex problems, as they rarely, if ever, fit any one or two disciplines very neatly. This may sound
straightforward, but it is not easy. Nobel laureate Herbert Simon (1967) noted that for professional
education, mixing the disciplinary perspectives of the scientists with practical problems of the
professionals is like mixing oil and water. The task is never finished since it requires constant
stirring.  Additionally, integration across disciplines does not come from one discipline talking
occasionally to his favorite intellectual neighbor who holds a (mostly) similar worldview, but rather
through genuine intellectual appreciation for other perspectives and what they can bring to improving our
understanding of warfighter issues. Fortunately, our PME institutions can help with this by facilitating
and encouraging (perhaps even insisting) more mixing and integration of different disciplines in their
application to explicit warfighter problems.
Focusing on integration helps us understand the promises and the limitations of models and analysis.  In
understanding Hughes’ way of thinking and (re)reading his analytic work, we also gain a better
appreciation for the promises and pitfalls of analysis.  Hughes acknowledges that analysis can help us
prepare for war and has previously helped us win wars and reduce their cost more than is appreciated.
Models, however, cannot capture certain imponderables (e.g., willpower, genius, surprise) that can
unpredictability swing the course of events and thus require prudence in their application. They can never
replace military judgment. Hughes cautioned us:
“Personally, I think that analysts—the good ones—next only to historians, understand best the imponderables
of the next war. But in the heat of our petty contentions to sell our service, or some hardware, or an idea, or a
strategy, we play down and eventually forget our doubts and misgivings. When the analysis is elegant, when
the arguments are compelling, when the model is elaborate, that is the time to remember a statement by our
host VADM Jim Stockdale: ‘if there was anything that helped us get through those eight years (as POWs), it
was plebe year, and if there was anything that screwed up that (Vietnam) war, it was computers.’”
Finally, educating for integrative minds and thinking effectively first requires cultivating the right mental






Prioritize problem framing (and reframing) and actively seek alternative and opposing views to
prove our own hypotheses incorrect.
Think critically, constructively, and strategically, and about the process of thinking itself to improve
our intellectual adaptability and be learners that are always eager to extend our knowledge, whether
through reading, experimentation, debates, or otherwise.
Encourage active open-mindedness and intuition, and inspire imagination and curiosity to inform
judgment and integrate analytical, intuitive, and synthesizing ways of understanding Navy and
warfighter problems.
Conclusion
We hope we have illustrated how the broader foundations and aspects of Hughes’ contributions are
important for recognizing how the core of his approach was not a narrow focus on specific disciplines and
models, but rather a larger appreciation of both the art and science of naval warfare. Additionally, his
work on analysis and tactics – the key to “fighting effectively first” – might be usefully supplemented with
an emphasis on “thinking effectively first.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff reminds us, “There is more to
sustaining a competitive advantage than acquiring hardware; we must gain and sustain an intellectual
overmatch as well.”  While effective fighting requires mental rigor and stamina and a sound assessment
of the enemy, the operating environment, and ourselves, we must cultivate effective thinking and
judgement above all. Let us embrace this challenge in the spirit of Captain Wayne Hughes’ legacy.
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